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Saturday, April 18, 2020 | History

2 edition of implications of the Chinese nuclear force for U.S. strategic and arms control policies found in the catalog.

implications of the Chinese nuclear force for U.S. strategic and arms control policies

Ralph N. Clough

implications of the Chinese nuclear force for U.S. strategic and arms control policies

prepared for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

by Ralph N. Clough

  • 107 Want to read
  • 3 Currently reading

Published by Brookings Institution in Washington .
Written in

    Places:
  • China,
  • United States
    • Subjects:
    • Nuclear arms control.,
    • China -- Defenses.,
    • United States -- Foreign relations -- China.,
    • China -- Foreign relations -- United States.

    • Edition Notes

      Statementprepared by Ralph N. Clough, project director ... [et al.].
      ContributionsUnited States. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
      Classifications
      LC ClassificationsJX1974.7 .C477
      The Physical Object
      Pagination2 v. ;
      ID Numbers
      Open LibraryOL5167268M
      LC Control Number74602366

      The Science of Military Strategy , Chinese Academy of Military Science; Red China's "Capitalist Bomb": Inside the Chinese Neutron Bomb Program by Jonathan Ray, Institute for National Security Studies, January ; Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning (FAS/NRDC, November ) China articles on FAS Strategic Security Blog.   Thomas J. Christensen, “The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution: China’s Strategic Modernization and US-China Security Relations,” Journal of Strategic Studies (August ): – ABSTRACT Will China’s development of a new generation of nuclear weapons impact US-China security relations in important ways?One’s answer depends on how one .   A new report brings Indian and Chinese nuclear forces and Chinese Strategic Nuclear Postures. force and by filling “the gap in global arms control leadership with . PRC State Council, China's Military Strategy in , The nuclear force is a strategic cornerstone for safeguarding national sovereignty and security. China has always pursued the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons and adhered to a self-defensive nuclear strategy that is defensive in nature. and will never enter.

        The demise of U.S.-Russian arms control, whether as a result of the current breakdown in relations between Moscow and Washington or under the weight of new strategic circumstances, is likely to reverberate well beyond the U.S.-Russian context. Arms Control Is a Continuation of Politics. The history of U.S.-Russian arms control closely follows.


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implications of the Chinese nuclear force for U.S. strategic and arms control policies by Ralph N. Clough Download PDF EPUB FB2

Get this from a library. The implications of the Chinese nuclear force for U.S. strategic and arms control policies: prepared for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

[Ralph N Clough; United States. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.]. The strategic arms control process to reduce nuclear weapons and contain the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a center piece of the United States arms control policy.

To be effective in arms control negotiations with the Chinese, the United States must understand China's past experience and perspectives regarding nuclear Size: KB. China, Nuclear Weapons, and Arms Control U.S.

interests vis-a`-vis China’s strategic modernization pro-gram and how best to secure outcomes consistent with U.S.

Few challenges loom as large on the U.S. foreign policy agenda as the effective management of relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC).

This is a perennial challenge, given China's central role in Asia and the many issues on the bilateral agenda that feature prominently in U.S.

domestic politics. Chinese Responses to U.S. Missile Defenses: Implications for Arms Control and Regional Security Article in The Nonproliferation Review 10(1). When we use the term implications of the Chinese nuclear force for U.S. strategic and arms control policies book arms control without a treaty,” we are referring to cooperative options that serve these objectives through means other than a treaty.

In practice, the United States has relied upon strategic nuclear arms control with Russia to further these objectives by fulfilling one primary role and.

Chinese Perceptions on Nuclear Weapons, Arms Control, and Nonproliferation the United States should seek to engage in high-level dialogues with China to clarify each other’s nuclear policies. instead the methodology necessary to assess U.S.

nuclear force requirements and arms control positions. The study first contrasts the basic contours of official U.S. policy with public proposals for new nuclear disarmament treaties, and.

China will optimize its nuclear force structure, improve strategic early warning, command and control, missile penetration, rapid reaction, and survivability and protection, and deter other countries from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against China.".

For example, though a kinetic or nonkinetic attack on U.S. nuclear command and control capabilities, which support both nuclear and non-nuclear missions, could have major repercussions, such an attack is unlikely to result in any human casualties.

the People’s Republic should cast these policies aside and adopt a new nuclear doctrine that will grant strategic forces a more prominent role in the country’s defense.

External and internal factors are driving changes in China’s nuclear policy and force structure and will continue to do so in the future. Concerns over what the Chinese. The People's Republic of China has developed and possesses weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and nuclear weapons. The first of China's nuclear weapons tests took place inand its first hydrogen bomb test occurred in Tests continued untilwhen China signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

China has acceded to the Biological and First nuclear weapon test: Octo The minimum deterrence argument appears in Sutter, “Chinese nuclear weapons and arms control policies,” in my earlier work (e.g.

“Chinese nuclear force modernization: implications for arms control,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Vol.

2, No. 2 (June ), and also in Wu Zhan, “Shilun zhanliie jingong wuqi” (“Preliminary Cited by: : China's Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age (Studies in International Security and Arms Control) (): Lewis, John Wilson, Litai, Xue: BooksCited by: National Intelligence Council China and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Implications for the United States Conference Report Chinese nuclear doctrine and force structure.

Rather, an understanding of such variables as domestic political, technological, historical, and cultural factors. The US Nuclear Posture Reviews (NPR) are the nation’s primary statements of nuclear weapons policy, and each has been debated closely.

However, the NPR is unusual in that it has been subject not only to debate about the rectitude of its policies, but also about what those policies actually are. Michael D. Intriligator and Dagobert L.

Brito, Arms Control: Problems and Prospects (San Diego, CA, ); Lynn Eden and Steven E. Miller, eds., Nuclear Arguments: Understanding the Strategic Nuclear Arms and Arms Control Debates (Ithaca, NY, ); and Zhang Xiaoming, Lengzhan jiqi yichan [The Cold War and Its Heritages] (Shanghai, ).Author: Xin Zhan.

While official Chinese opposition to U.S. missile defenses became highly vocal and vehement only in the late s, the issue itself was nothing new to Beijing. Chinese ana- lysts carefully studied the implications of President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, or Star Wars) in the early s.

Internal and external exchanges on security tradeoffs and arms control may dampen the pernicious effects of strategic competition. A broad and inclusive internal deliberation on the development and employment of new technologies like MIRVs can force states to weigh the costs, risks, and negative externalities.

of Chinese nuclear weapons policy relevant both to neighboring non-nuclear weapons states concerned about the possibil ity of China using its nuclear weap-ons to influence the outcome of territorial disputes and to U.S.

military planners worried about a Chinese nu-clear response to a conventional U.S. attack. It states that:File Size: KB. Varying perspectives on China's military modernization are presented against a framework that considers U.S. national security policy, the Strategic Defense Initiative, and strategic trade with China, in addition to China's own nuclear deterrent and its military posture vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, Japan, and Southeast Asia.

plans, special operations forces, homeland defense, missile defense, nuclear weapons and arms control policies, counterproliferation, counternarcotics, counterterrorism, arms sales, and defense trade controls.

He served as U.S. ambassador to Finland in File Size: 1MB. New START caps U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals at 1, deployed warheads, deployed missiles and heavy bombers, and deployed and nondeployed missile launchers and bombers each.

It also put into place a rigorous inspection and verification regime, on which the U.S. military relies for knowledge about the Russian arsenal. U.S. Strategic Nuclear Policy: A Video History, Sandia Labs Historical Video Documents History of U.S. Strategic Nuclear Policy. Interviewees Include Robert McNamara, Brent Scowcroft, James Schlesinger and Last Strategic Air Commander-in-Chief Lee Butler.

Includes Revelations on "Out of Control" Nuclear Targeting During the s. The NPR may also affect the current plans to sustain and upgrade each element of the U.S.

strategic arsenal, including new long-range, stealthy strategic bombers; a fleet of 1, new nuclear-capable air-launched cruise missiles; a new fleet of 14 strategic submarines; new ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles; and upgraded nuclear command-and-control. CHINA’S NUCLEAR FORCES: OPERATIONS, TRAINING, DOCTRINE, COMMAND, CONTROL, AND CAMPAIGN PLANNING Larry M.

Wortzel May This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined. Evolving Chinese Thinking About Deterrence: The Nuclear Dimension Dean Cheng the difference between u.s.

and Chinese in his book, Arms and Influence. A Study of China’s No-First-Use Policy on Nuclear Weapons Zhenqiang Pan (Retired) Institute for Strategic Studies, National Defense University PLA, Beijing, China ABSTRACT China’s no-first-use policy implies that the country possesses nuclear weapons only to deter other states from a nuclear Cited by: 1.

Seapower Questions on the Chinese Submarine Force, U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, Decem Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning (FAS/NRDC, November ) White Paper on China's Endeavors for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China.

Lessons from North Korean Denuclearization: Implications for Nonproliferation, Arms Control and the Nuclear Taboo. By: arms control and the norm of nuclear non-use then there could be a domino effect starting with aggressive Chinese and North Korean force posture changes and increases in nuclear weapon development, which could cross.

Moscow seems to value constraints on U.S. nuclear forces, and as the U.S. strategic modernization effort moves into high gear in the early s, Russia could be keen to maintain arms.

As Lt. General James Kowalski, Vice Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, stated ina Russian nuclear attack on the United States is such “a remote possibility” that it is “hardly. China's arms sales have become the focus of considerable attention and pose a moderate threat to U.S.

interests. Although Chinese sales have fallen in recent years, and Beijing has become more responsible in the transfer of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) technologies, much progress will be needed to curtail China's by: 9. Frank A. Rose testifies before the U.S.

House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade hearing on "Russian and Chinese Nuclear Author: Frank A. Rose. est concern, and identifies possible constraints on China's arms sales.

It then assesses the threat posed by the transfers. This study is part of a larger, multiyear project on "Chinese Defense Modernization and Its Implications for the U.S.

Air Force." Other re Cited by: 9. Russia has said that if the U.S. side can persuade China to participate, then other nuclear-armed states such as France and the United Kingdom should be involved.

In Russia’s view, which nuclear arms issues and which types of weapons should be part of any bilateral or multilateral follow-on negotiation to New START. U.S. Nuclear Weapons: Policy, Force Structure, and Arms Control Issues Introduction For more than a decade, since the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the demise of the Soviet Union, analysts inside and outside government have offered a wide range of views on how the United States should adjust its military establishment to accommodate the changing.

The origins of the Chinese nuclear program were made during the Eisenhower administration desion to reduce American troops in Korea.

During this period, Eisenhower decided to increase American strategic forces (nuclear), thus adding to Chinese insecurity.

According to the book, Mao wanted a paper tiger and the nuclear bomb was the by: An analysis of China's nuclear and space capabilities, deployment strategies, and stance in arms control negotiations, and the implications for U.S.

defense strategy. InThe Minimum Means of Reprisal, Jeffrey Lewis examines China's nuclear and space capabilities and deployment strategies, as well as the Chinese government's stance in arms control negotiations.

U.S. Security Policy in Asia: Implications for China-U.S. Relations, paper by Wu Xinbo, Visiting Fellow, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, SeptemberAuthor: Wu Xinbo. “Strategic stability”, a cold war arms control concept, is at the centre of China’s world view.

Russia is willing to strengthen China in its competition with the US.One year from today, on February 5,the New START treaty will expire, unless the United States and Russia act to extend the last nuclear arms control agreement for an additional five years.

No matter your political orientation, treaty extension is a no-brainer – for at least six primary reasons. 1. New START keeps nuclear arsenals in check.Arms control is a term for international restrictions upon the development, production, stockpiling, proliferation and usage of small arms, conventional weapons, and weapons of mass destruction.

Arms control is typically exercised through the use of diplomacy which seeks to impose such limitations upon consenting participants through international treaties and .